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1. 
P03t-World War II Japanese politics have been marked 
by the persistent dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party, 
whose members are generally considered to uphoH conservative 
policies. ~his party with its several distinct factions has main-
tained control of the national government and the decentralized 
governments from the Occupation period (1945-52) to the present 
day. In order to preserve their position, t. y have remarkably 
withstood the democratization process imposed by Occupation pol-
icies upon tl::e Japanese nation. 
The Occupation did possess the 
physical ,ower, in its military 
force, t, impose any reform it 
desired, but as the Japanese 
themselves did not desire them, 
the reforms wouH inevitably 
lapse as soon as the Occupation 
pressure was removed.l 
Reforms outlined by the Occupation forces involved a clear re-
vision ot the political situation prior to the war with one goal 
being the achievement ot political maturation throughout the 
count 17 .. 
Politically, the Occupation sought 
to debar trom power the individuals 
who had been responsibls for the 
militaristic, ultra-nationalistic 
and authoritarian character of the 
Japanese nation and to encourage 
the rise to power of more p~pularlJ 
representatIve elements ••• M 
Lxazuo Kawai, Japants American Interlude (Chicagot Ubiver-
slty of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 2$ 
2~., p. 24 
1 
This goal has been aChieved insofar as the Japanese have devel-
oped a strong parliamentary system of government still controlled 
by conservative majorities that seem politically representative 
of this developing nation~ 
The salient feature of Japants government is the ro. 
of parties in the political system and their determined etfort 
to achieve power. f·'Japanese poli tics ••• has been m~rked in the 
postwar period by the existence of • multi-party system~"3 al-
though "it is tempting ••• to call the Japanese party sys tem a one-
and-a-halt party system ••• n4 The Liberal Democrats, representing 
conservative elements, have been the stalwarts of the government 
tor they have aided in causing Occupation reforms whi. bolster-
ing their own support even though revisions could considerably 
have diminished their controlling position. eyoshida's disin-
clination to bow before the shrine ot SOAP made him a reputed 
bulwark of Japanese institutions aga\inst evangelical zealot the 
alien reformer.m5 
JSigmund Neumann~ Modern Political Parties (Chicago: Univer-
ot Chicago Press, 1956,-p.338. -
4Robert Soalapino and Junn.suke Masumi, Parties and Politics 
of contemporary Japan (Berkel.y~ University ot California Press, 
11962, p.79~ 
5Harold S. Quigley and John B. Turner, The New Japan (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956.), p.2qO. Yoshida 
was prime minister in parts of 1946 and 1941; and from October 
1948 to December, 1954. His break in power during 1947-48 found 
the Socialists gaining control of the prime ministership, the 
only time that they have enjoyed such control to the present day. 
2 
"!n the ~evival of political pa~ties Japanese and For-
eign influences intermingled. Ea~ly directives f~om SOAP encou~­
aged new pa~ties and stimulated the o~!,6 Howeve~, the attempts 
t:oestablish new pa~ties fell sho~t in that the only significant 
change was that the parties vested new names. For example, the 
Libe~als and Democrats, who we~e to merge in 1955 as the present-
day LOP, ~eflected the positions held by the Seiyakai and Min-
seito pa~ties of the 1920's. Both the modern and the earlier par-
ties benefited f~om ~ural and business suppo~t, an advantage that 
has kept these conservative pa~ties in control ot the government 
processes. Therefore, in the plethora of parties existing after 
the war. many of the principles subscribed to were not altered. 
although the increasing political interest of the people has de-
manded SUbstantial revisions and innovations in party politics. 
The extent to which the pa~ties have met this transfo~mation is 
signified by their existing powe~ in today's gove~nment~ 
Thus the designation of the Japa-
nese party system of the ea~ly post-
wa1l" period as a multi-party system 
requires SUbstantial qualification. 
Two of the five national parties were 
never critical or even vital facto~s 
in the national scene."1 ~ 
This predicament has been protracted into the present 
system where the Liberal Democrats continue to sustain their very 
6~redith Cameron, Thomas H. Mahoney, and George E. McRey-
nolds, China, Japan, and the Powers (New York: The Ronald Press 
Co., 1952), p.58q. 
1~ealapino, op.cit., P. 40 
strong majority at the expense of a weak, but not powerless op-
positlon. During this entire post-Occupation period, the Social-
ist Party has represented the main opposition to the LOP, with 
its strength (which has usually been approximately 30 to 35 per 
cent) at times producing a two-party struggle. However, "the 
Socialists have never been able to break through the barrier that 
separates them from two-thirds of the electorate.-a Dissent bred 
by conflicting socialistic ideologies within their own ranks has 
caused what seems to be a permanent split by the right-wing n.m-
ocratic Socialists from the basically left-wing organization. 
Basically unabl.) to consolidate their factional forces, 
they remain M ••• a permanent minority, never even in power."9 
However, this division within the Socialist ranks is actually ba-
sic to Japanese parties tor * ... there is not a single party in 
Japanese history, except for the Communists, whioh has not been 
the result of a merger or a spIlt of some kind. MlO Moreover, the 
merger involved in establishing the LOP has produced continued 
suocess for their party, although they too are pressured by fac-
tional loyalty which could disrupt their strensth as the 1eadlng 
party in Japanese politics. 
~ealapino, op.cit., p.19. 
9Ibid ... p.19. 
-
lOChitoshi yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (New York. 
John WIley and Sons, 19.56) p.239. The Japan Communist Party is 
presently engaged in a rift over loyalty; whether they shou~ re-
main completely and solely allied with Moscow or Peking or esta-
blish oomparatively equal relations with both. 
Japan does have a multi-party system including the LOP, 
Socialists, Democratic Socialists, Korn.ito, and the Communist, 
but it is more precisely " ••• a system ot loosely-structured ted-
erations."ll Each party is a conglomeration ot divergent and 
distinct tactions, with their own particular leader (s) and goal. 
These two tactors primarily ~oduce any cohesiveness that a party 
enjoys, thus £orcing national party organizations to depend UpoR 
their continued support~ This allows each £action to manipulate 
their policies through the party ot their choice. Simultaneously, 
they maintain a semi-autonomous nature even though specitically 
attiliated with a party. Existenee ot this indigenous system is 
necessitated by "factional loyalt.,. which tends to become the 
primary loyalty, being greater than that being given the tted-
eration t or any external group."12 
Sinee 1945', the Liberal Democrats*, have automatically 
received an overwhelming majority ot the rural vote with a min-
imum ot political communication. This unique rural support has 
reasserted i tselt ele ction after election, with the resultant 
ettects ot enabling conservative candidates to compile excellent 
voting records and to maintain their control ot government on all 
levels. 
- '.' llscalapino, op. cit., p.79. 
12Ibid., p.79. 
*From the war to November, 195'5', today's Liberal Democrats 
were two distinct groups: Liberals (known in 1948 as Democratic 
Liberals) and Democrats (known in 1947 and again in 195'4 as the 
Japan Progressive Party). 
Approximately 49 per cent ot the 
Japanese electorate may be clas-
sitied in the rural or agrarian 
categories, although many should 
be placed in the mixed or agrar-
ian related categories rather than 
in the pure tormer designation.l 3 
By controlling this heavy rural vote, which 1s currently dimin-
ishing, the LOP's struggle to acquire and exercise power has be. 
greatly facilitated. The main reason that the LOP has been the 
bem-tactor or this rural vote is that they have stood tor con-
servatism and thus received support consequential to peculiar 
traditional traits tound in rural areas o 
By exploiting these traditional socio-political traits, 
traits which one writer terms " ••• discreditable vestiges ot an 
outmoded or 'Asian t or 'teudal' past which should be given speedy 
burial,"14 Liberal Democrats have been provided with electoral 
means to enforce a new conservatism. 
In the early 1900's, conservatism 
means something tar ditterent trom 
what it meant only two decades ear-
lier. It does not stand tor: em-
peror worship ••• subjugation ot 
wom.n ••• omnipotence ot male head in 
tamily •••• conomic control by the 
zaibatsu ••• single party system ••• 
militarism and agression.15 
i~calapino, op.cit., p.07. 
l4R.E. Ward , "Political Modernization and Culture in Japan," 
WOrld Politics, XV (July, 1963), P.$90o 
l5Jobn M. Xaki, Government and Politics in Japan (New York: 
Fred.rick &. Praeger, 1962), p.t62 
6 
Although their conservatism is not the status-quo type since the 
are entangled ina country developing and maturing politically, 
they still balance programs directed toward a more independent 
country and preservation of economic democracy. To accomplish 
this they must maintain the rural vote, even if their Diet* mem-
bers do not represent agricultural interests. For one thing, 
~not much more than one-titth ot the conservative Diet members 
today have their primary attiliation with agriculture. nIb Since 
the LOP wishes to keep control ot the Diet because it is their 
source ot power as a political party, it 1s to their advantage 
to exploi t the "comf'ortable cushion ot pt. ssive support"!17 which 
modern conservatism reserve. from tarmers and rural inhabitants. 
7 
The Japanese political system has matured to the extent 
that "political power has come to depend on the votes ot the ele~ 
torate,nl8 ot which a large percentage consistently votes con-
servative (or tor the LOP). Theretore, continuation of a consetv 
ative pattern of government has been easily accomplished with the 
definite support supplied by the rural areas to tne Liberal Dem-
ocrats, who are still averting the political maturation ot Japan 
lbScalapino, op.cit., p~b8 
17H.H.Baerwald, ·'Pac tional Politics in Japan, It Current His-
tory, XLVI (April, 1964), p. 226. 
l8Xawai, op.cit., p. 126. 
*Japan's national Diet has a bicameral organization: The 
lower House ot Representatives (4b7 members) and the upper House 
ot Councilors (250 members). S'ince the Liberal Democrat. have 
always strongly elected majorities to both houses, they have been 
able to control the selection ot the prime minister, who has al-
ways been a conservative except tor KAtayama (Socialist) in 1947. 
by the traditional vote and by becoming a more representative 
party for the entire nation. 
8 
Japanese voting records signify incredible success of 
conservative candidates at the polls. The most outstanding result 
of their being elected to office is that they have developed a 
mwinner" psychology. Bven though their total popular vote has 
been declining, they continue to control the national legislature 
and other assemblies. In what appears to be an unalterable situ-
ation, the Socialist Party stagnates in its minority role, unable 
to lift it.elf into power. It seems to have accepted the fact of 
LOP polItical predominance, a realization which aggravates theIr 
already disruptive nature among their tactions. Without necessa~ 
coordination, the Socialists have not maintained a definite party 
policy program and have forcibly resorted to verbal attacks on 
LOP programming. The Socialist role has become too negative-
their party too inconsistent-and their hopes for power too dimin-
utive. 
.Augmenting the large rural support of the LOP is its 
linkage to several particular business groups, which are national 
in organization but whose support is most effective among smaller 
affiliations usually found in urban areas. Big business is the 
financier ot the LOP and the reward tor their support has been 
illustrated in the f~vorable legislation put forth by the party. 
This makes bUsiness. unlike the rural backers who are not fully 
rewarded for their support, a most powerful element in Japanese 
politics. 
Thirdly, the LOP incumbents in the national legislature 
have one peculiar characteristic: many of them are former bureau-
crats, experienced in a particular area of government, and cogni-
zant ot the political power that the LOP posaesses_ It is common 
for a bureaucrat to retire from the rigors of the administrative 
battlefield when he reaches 50 years of age {a very general ru~ 
and immediately find his way back into the legislative process 
through party politics. This experienced bureaucratic element 
also tends to be conservative, thus giving the LOP a practice 
area for their future members. 
9 
In sum, "the conservative predominance in Japan is the 
product of a triple alliance between the bureaucracy, key national 
interest groups many of which are affiliated with bu.iness, and 
the LDP."19 "The new power elite of Japan consist. in a combi-
nation ot ••• rising entrepreneur •••• top level bureaucrat •••• pol-
i ticians representing ••• business and bureaucrats ."20 FUrthermore, 
even though the LOP receives such astounding rural support, the 
government seems to be involved in promoting particular policies 
of the triple alliance, none of which entail. the true public in-
terest. "There seems to be no agency which serves as the defende 
of the public interest ••• ft2l "Japanese politics have been condi-
19seal apino, op.cit., p.93. 
20Ardath W. Burks, The Government of Japan (New York: Thomas 
w. Crowell Co., 1961), p. 11 
2lNobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics (New York: Albert A.Knopf, 
11957), p.286. 
tioned much more directly by economic and social realities ••• "22 
envisioned mainly by the bureaucracy and various Diet members. 
Nevertheless, politioal parties are not beginning to overshadow 
both the Cabinet and the bureaucracy, accepting growing demands 
for governmental productivity. people are finding them promising 
rather than puerile. 
10 
The Japanese political system is definitely maturing, 
although it still is not trul~ representative ot the public in-
terest. A unique aspe et ot this situation is the strong backing 
or the LOP candidates by the eonservative rural areas, although 
they are the'~'~least represented in national party policies. The 
opposing parties have not really permeated the strict traditional 
barriers ot the rural areas. To truly understand this political 
situation, exploration ot rural socio-political determinants com-
bined with their relationship to the ascending order governmental 
levels i. expedient. B~ evaluating buraku and village political 
partiCipation, the solid"ltUljorit,. wh1c h the LDP has possessed on 
all levels ot government oan be explained.. As the Japanese nati 
matures in its politic.l knowledge, the conservatism or these 
areas will be all-important to the survival or conservatism in the 
nation and the continuing rule or the Liberal Democratic Party. 
22Yanaga, op.cit., p.89. 
CHAPl'ER IT 
THE BURAKU AND GROUP COHESIVENESS 
The foundation for traditional Japanese conservatism is 
found in the buraku. ~ ••• The buraku is an indigenous natural group 
operating on the ba.i. of traditional mores ••• • 23 It ~plays a 
more immediate role in the daily lives of a larger proportion of 
the Japanese people than any of the more formal and better mown 
units ot organization,"24 and has been called the *most important 
structure of rural Japan.~25 The buraku i. not a legal political 
entity which makes it an autonomous area with little need for po-
litical management~ 
The buraku usually consists of a number. of very closely-
knit families, otten related by kinship, constituting a household 
l!. "The family unit that most frequently forms the basis of bu-
~ organization today il the household~ a group of relatives us-
ually embracing two or more conjugal families of different gener-
a tions. lli26 Seldom, if ever, n, ••• does any man, woman, or child th 
23XUrt Steiner, Local Government in Japan (Stanford: Stanford 
University Pres., 1905), P.207. 
24A.R. Radcliffe-Brown in Suye MUra, A Japanese Village (Chi-
cago, 1939) by John F. Embre& as quoted by steIner, p.zo1. 
25aobert B. Ward, ~The Socia-Political Role of the Buraku 
(Hamlet) in Japan,~ American Political Science Review, XLV (1950), 
p.) 1025. 
2osteiner. op.oit., p.2l0. 
11 
12 
ot himself or another person apart from his role as a member of 
his house. The ie looms above the individual.~27 No matter what 
one is involved in, " ••• the family is always the prime constituent 
element ••• ft28 With this reinforced rigidity enveloping its com-
position, it becomes quite difricult for an outsider to penetrate 
the walls of the buraku or for outside influences to be attractive 
or known by the people. This group-enforced blockade surrounding 
the buraku people has rendered this area particularly susceptible 
to conservatism and group consciousness, two elements which com-
plement each other, for the same traditionalism which sustains 
conservative attitudes within each individual also controls group 
behavioral patterns o 
The Japanese tamily ft ••• has a hierarchical structure 
at the pinnacle of this structure •• ~which may be thought ot as 
pyramidical in shape, stands the male head of the tamily .. ft29 This 
patriarchal affection has been the basis for Japan's one. native 
ideal-that ot kokutai. The kokutal concept involved the nation 
until 1945 in emperor worship, for- the emperor- was 1x> the nation 
what the father was to the tami]y. Today, the emperor's position 
is defined in Article 1 of the 1947 constitution: "The emperor 
shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people." 
27Richard K. Beardsley, John W. Hall. and Robert E. Ward, 
Village Japan (Chicago, University of Chicago Pr-ess, 1959), p.216. 
(Tfiis is a stud,. of Niilke, a village in the Okayama prefecture. 
28steiner, op.cit., p.210 
29Ike, ~.cit., p.18 
1), 
The Japanese tather has never symbolically held his po-
sition but has rather maintained a patriarohal predominance as an 
actual sooial t orce within the buraku. It is to him that alleg-
iance is due; it is he who partially develops the political think-
ing of his wite and children. For example: 
While the household with the father 
as head is clearly the fundamental 
uait ot the social and economic lite 
ot Niiik8, the collectivity ot house-
hold. i. itself an integral communal 
entity. When acting .s a political 
unit, the people ot Niike reter to 
themselves as buraku.30 
People ot the buraku are further bound by an understand-
ing of group consciou.ness. "Since the Japanese live in closely-
knit groups and in a ctual physical proximity •.•• they think, act, 
and live as a group."31 It is somewhat like the small American 
village where everyone seems to know all about any local topic. 
In Japan, it is paramount to perform and think exactly as the 
others do. The village group is considered tar more important 
than the individual. 
Each buraku individually selects a headman known a s the 
"buraku ~~)2 for the community. His duty involve. overseeing the 
activities ot the buraku, reporting important movements and deci-
sions occuring ift the immediate a rea, a nd consulting with impor-
tant local people on certain stand. to be supported. His job i. 
JOBeardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit.,. p.248. 
31Yanaga, op.eit., p.43. 
32steiner~ op.cit., p.2ll o 
basically a part-time activity, unwanted except by those who are 
local favorites or by those who exhibit a reoognized desire for 
leadership. 
How does the headman maintain cohesiveness and compata-
bility in the buraku? He actually does nothing because the Japa-
nese peopB have Qtraditional notions of harmony ••• reflected in 
the manner in whioh decisions are made at the buraku meetings. Q33 
This traditional principle is known as wago. ~It rejects quarrel~ 
among ourselves.~34 Replacing elements of debate are norms prac-
ticed to achieve a compromise evolving into consensus. 
"The traditional means of taking group decisions in Ja-
pan is by the joint techniques of recommendation (suisen) and con-
sensus."35 The Japanese seem to have a strong distaste for argu-
mentation;, they prefer to have a smooth compromise because their 
social propinquity all but commands it. 
In relating ~ to the political arena, this element 
has found acceptance asa "necessary ••• political modus vivendi."36 
To what matters does the buraku assembly apply these techniques ot 
decision? Formally, they are very simple and of narrowly local 
significance. ~heir moat important function ia the selection of 
33steiner, op.cit., p.216. 
34Ike, op.cit., p.59. 
35Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., P.15~. 
36Yanaga, op.cit., p.45 
buraku offioers, a headman, and vice-headmen. "37 B,. establishing 
a shared attitude through consultation~ no real oounter-argument 
remains. Eaoh individual in the buraku relies on those selected 
through oompromise or outright unanimit,. to extend the element of 
wago into the seleotion of local political candidates. Through 
wago and its oorollary, oonsultation, Protessor Yanag. points out 
that: 
••• this attitude ••• underlies the 
practice of stre •• ing accept~ 
bilit,. as the decisive criterio. 
in the choice of political lead-
ers. This has the effect invar-
iably of narrowing down the choice 
to the least objectionable, rath~r 
than the most desirable person.3 tl 
Those people influential within the ~~ have some social statu8 
which serves as a :cI.eterminant in electing these people to buraku 
positions. S'ince they primarily control the wago process through 
oonsultation, their deci.ion will beoome the enveloping rule for 
the people. '!he main eftect ot suoh a condi tion i. that the people. 
vote en masse tor the sante oandidates. Wh,.? Because it the bu raktl 
leader. have determined to vote for a oertain candidate, whether 
it be tor the national legislature, pretectural assembly, or even 
village assembly, they must follow the consensus in the buraku. 
Failure to do so could reBul t in social·- ostracism, ~ hachibu. 
One writer has hypothesized that "perhaps the most in-
digenous contribution of Japan to the soienoe ot government la,. 
jTaeardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.355. 
38Yanaga, op.cit., p.85. 
16 
in the highl~ developed system of discussion, adjustment, consen-
sus and joint responsibllity."39 This may be true on the national 
or prefectural level, but in the buraku "the farmer's traditional 
attitude toward polities has had no positive or responsible part 
to pla~ in the public decision-making proe ••• ,"4o which involves 
selectic. of candidates. Politically, an individual does not trtil 
pOises. a leparate role; instead one's political activities "are 
.arried out within some group context."4l Ultimately, those who 
can vote are required to exercise their right to do so, and ad-
ditionally, they must liken their votes to those of the entire 
buraku. 
To expose these political behavioral patterns fUrther, 
transfer of these voting habits to village elections is necessary. 
Why? In village elections, "each buraku desires to obtain as man 
seats in the assembly as is possib~., considering the .umber ot 
it. votes."42 mrhe chance for this is best if the numbers of can 
didates equals the number of seat. it can obtain it all voters 
vote for these candidates.~43 Often~ people who are village lead~ 
39Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. eda., Political 
Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton trnIversi 
PreiS, 1964), pp.75-6. 
40Beardlley, Hall, and Ward, op.oit., pp.44l-2. 
4 I Y.Kuroda, "Political Role Attributes and Dynamics in a Ja 
anese Community," public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX {Winter, 1965-6CJ, 
p.bI3. 
42steiner, op.cit., p.4l0. 
43Ibid., p.4l0 
17 
in government hold predominant positions in their respective bu-
raku. 
*In effect the ~uraku resident votes traditionally for 
a representative of his ~ur.ku in the village assembly."44 This 
has three peculiar effects on the political prooe.s: oampaigning 
reaches a low ebb in buraku bailiwioks since it is unnecessary; 
competition will be highly unlikely, and party affiliation becom. 
superfluous in the election prooess. "The village governments es-
tablished by the Looal Autonomy Law may best be desoribed as min-
iature semi-parliamentary systems, evolving primarily about the 
offices and interrelationship of a village assembly and a mayor~5 
"Local autonomy on the village level requires that the inhabitant. 
consider the village government as 'their government; that they 
do not shrink back from it but participate in it. "46 In order to 
use village government as a tool to implement certain buraleu ideas 
or programs, the leaders must stand behimd a oandidate whom they 
trust and who.e chances of winning remain praotically beyond a 
a doubt should all traditional determinant. be functioning. 
Caapaigning is actually unnecessary in running for vil-
lage office frequently because advanoe oaloulation of candidates 
44s'teiner, op.cit., p.2~lOo 
45Beardsley. Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.360. Village govern-
ments as established by law are the lowest regular units of reg-
ulatory public organization. A mayor and a village assembly man-
age their operations. 
46steiner, op.cit., p-.226 
are so accurate that no election is necessary. ~In the election 
of town and village mayors ••• the ratio of candidate to position 
was 2.0 in 1947, 1.9 in 1951, 1.8 in 1955, and 1.9 in 1959."47 
18 
If any app,eal be necessary, the ca.ndidate should petition the col-
lectivity rather than the individual in the community. Such an sp-
peal ~is in line with traditional mores."48 "Active campaigning 
remains not only superfluous but also slightly improper in the 
eyes of tradition-bound villagers."49 
With this directive to attain resu1ts of the election 
prior to 'Voting day, compe ti tion oan be eliminated through a.cknow-
ledged support for a oertain candidate. The deoision on voting 
procedure is regulated through the buraku channels where the can-
didate to be supported holds a oonsensus vote. AS a general rule, 
~the average villager wants a man of maturity and dignity, poses-
.ed of a. many of the traditional 3apanese virtues as possible. 
High among these ranks sincerity (mokato), politene.s, and a hu-
mane interest in the problems of his rellows."50 When there i. 
competition for a village office and no one candidate s •• ms to 
have a definite majerity, alliance. of individual burakus may be 
made. Through this process, one candidate may likely achieve a 
leading position still subject to direct challenge. However, the 




50Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.365. 
19 
prinoipal reason ror avoiding this partioular situation is that 
ttthe buraku vote will be split and all the chances ror maximum 
representation will be dlminished. tt5l ''' ••• 12 per cent or all t<nm 
and village a.semblymen i~ 1955 and 7.2 per cent in 1959 were se-
lected ••• without any oppesition ••• Thu. the system dees not work 
to perrection ••• but it works well enough to keep the competition 
ration extremely 10w."52 
Granted praotioally unanimous suppert aDd lacking any 
true competition, a oandidate has no r.al need to b. party-arril-
iat.d. ORee h. is elected to a village orri •• and desires to as-
cend the governmental scale, ha may the. turn to a party for ad-
ditio:nal support, ir the part.y does not first appeal to him for 
control of the vote he can pro~ ••• Even with this opportunity, 
" ••• most candidates do net appeal to any particular interest that 
transoends buraku lIme.; it is only natural that most or them are 
pure independents. 1t53 And being independents, the people In the 
buraku are denied .ven a glimpse or the demooratic political prec 
••••• which are clearly a part or the heavier-populated areas. 
But, this situatio. is partially fostered by their OIft refusal to 
challenge traditional line. o 
In such a taut, tradition-bound area a. the buraku, can-
tinued emphasis placed upo. traditionalism aids those candidates 
tabbed as conservatives. In the electoral process, many candidates 




for localeffice rult as i.dependent. ,. with mest ot them being con-
.ervative candidates. "Tft the 1955 e~ctions, ot some 43,168 ~in­
dependent~ ca.didate •••• 7.5 per cent had Socialist orientations •• 
maRY were conservative •• ~54 Since the buraku people are conserv-
ative and the otficials they elect tend to be likewise, Wllque sup 
port is rendered to the LOP. Over and above this contribution USs 
the fact that personality is tar mere important than party which 
di.tillguishes the individual's over-all donation to buraku c ... erv 
atis. from just that ot the buraku preper. III beiRg elected to a 
village post, tor example, a person normally has the backing of a 
number of burakus,which become a definite support organization 
he can depend upen. These conservatives in the villages and the 
hamlets have a collective bloc of votes to be utilized either by 
themselves as independents or by a national party faction of the 
Liberal Democratic Part yo 
summarily, the socio-political determinaat ot wago hal 
caused the buraku pe.ple to be involved ift conservative loyalty 
t. per.onality, rather than complete participation in govermmeat 
and polities. Protessor Maki concludes: " ••• the Japaaese iadiv-
idual has already de •• nstrated that he is capable ot acting as a 
respeKaible oiti~elt under democracy.~55 This seems quite uareas-
enable it oae scrutinizes the rural political picture. ~rofessor 
54Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, ep.cit., p.407 
55Maki, op.cit., p.128 o 
Maki believes that the Japanese individual: 
•• oexercisel the right of suffrage; 
he is interested in controversial 
issues ot both pelitics and govern-
meat;- he is oapable ot criticizing 
political leaders, parties, and pro-
cedures; he is vitally eoncer~ed with 
the maintenance of the democratic 
processes aad structure that have 
given concrete be.efits.56 
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Urban votera, who are more independent and politically refined, 
tit the Protellor's description;- but, the individual enclosed by 
buraku traditioaali.m lacks positive i!'lvolvement in pelities te 
the exteat that he i. apolitical outside ot exercising hi. right 
t. vete. The buraku individual's connection to government is nen. 
existent because he does taot participate. ttIJn Niiike 8.lld Kamo, 
government continues to be regarded as something that is done t. 
ud for rather than by the SNerage citizeno ft 57 Voting in blocs 
as the singular political activity of the buraku people does not 
prove their political responsibility because this is practiced 
mechanically. 
56waki, op.cit., p.128. 
57Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.~03. 
CHAPTER III 
OBLIGATIONS AND POLITICS 
A second socio-political determinant primarily unique 
in rural politics is oyabun-kobun~ a system of obligational rela-
tionships "based upon simulated patrimonial principles. It 58 It is 
a system of perpetual obligations, as loyalty to superiors, im-
posed upon people through their natural interaction with otherso 
Regarding politics, alignment of voter support through these ob-
ligational relationships enables a candidate to secure definitive 
backing external to particular party affiliation. Bureaucrats can 
establish a myriad of these relationships through pro~otion of 
legislation in the Diet advantageous to certain groups of people. 
As repayment for this cooperation, the affected group obligates 
itself to accept the role of kobun by accomodating the bureaucrat 
with a promised favor. 
Relatioi!.lships of this nature are entirely unattainable 
wdthout norms to describe the obligation to be fulfilled. These 
particular norms are two 2: ~ and giri •. "The word for obligations 
which cover a person's indebtedness from greatest to least is 
on. tt59 Life according to these norms is a perpetual accumulation 
of successive favors demanding reimbursement. If'To an Occidental, 
58t .. ao Ishino and John W. Bennett, "The Japanese Labor Boss 
Sys teuP (The Ohio state Unt versi ty Research Foundation" 1952), p.l 
as cited in Ike's, Japanese Politics~ op.cit., p.26o 
59Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: 
Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1946), p.99. 
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giri includes a most heterogenous list of obligations ranging fro 
gratitude tor an old kindness to the duty of revenge."60 Giri h 
two additional divisions: " ..... giri to the world ... one's obligation 
to repay ~ to one's tellows~ •• and giri to one's name ••• the duty 
of keeping one's name and reputation ••• ~6l 
Within the buraku community a child has on to his fa~ 
for his being brought lmto the world. What remains of this patlB 
in the buraku is used to bolster the traditional conservatism ob-
structing political maturation. How can this be accomplished' 
If a child is disallowed the opportunity to perceive political 
modernization through coercive devotion to the group and endless 
indebtedness provoked through fundamental interaetion, he will de-
velop the same apathetic concern for government still persistent 
in rural communi ties 0 Urban areas are p'ractical~y devoid ot these 
peculiar determinants due to their accent on individuality and 
definite conoern for the political processes ot the nation. 
Furthermore, shou1d the individual Japanese citizen ob-
tain tavors trom other individuals who eventually run for political 
office, repayment in the form ot a vote becomes very accessible. 
Recogmd_ihg that he has a definite duty to tulfill to his oyabun 
and a supplementary obligation to vote with the group, only one 
choice is available even if there is keen competition. Thoughtful 
voting cannot be exercised so long as the individual citizen does 
OOsennett, op.cit., p.133 
6lIbid.,. p.l34. 
not participate in a mature political system • .2!! and giri con-
stantly reinforce the dutiful reciprocation binding an individual 
to the oyabun (superior), and thereby forbidding escape should 
the matter of voting be introduced as a mode of repayment. 
The Liberal Democratic p~ty has exploited this deter-
minant since 1955 when the Liberals and Democrats merged. There 
is no doubt that through their success in attaining political of-
fice as a factionaliaed party they have undertaken the establish-
ment of a branched party organization, one which includes tapping 
rural obligational relationships and inaugurating similar patt~s 
on much higher levels. Instead of simply relying upon the vote 
they will receive from traditional supporters~ the party has de-
centralized its organization in order to take greater advantage 
• 
of this peculiar situation. although concentration of real local 
power is still held by factional leaders and their organizations. 
The experienced politician may be an oyabun within a 
certain group. And within each other group, this same ~oss-henCh­
men"62 relationship may prevail, with competition among entire 
groups to infuse additional groups not as strong as they. Groups 
" ••• seek to bind one another in complex alignments and contract-
ural obligations ramifying in various direotions so that they form 
an overlapping and interlocking web."63 What has been establi~ 
~2Kawai, op.cit., p.115. 
63Ibid., p.115. 
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is an G"yabun-kobun interrelationship emending through the amal-
gamation of various obligational groups. "The man who fares best 
in this type of system is one who can subtly take advantage of 
the constantly shifting balance of power among these interacting 
groups to maneuver his group to the top."64"Wlth an important 
political leader managing an obedient clientele or offering in-
ducements to those who join his ranks, it is not surprising that 
the parties have become faction-ridden in the mad scramble for 
power and advantage."65 
Rural areas are much easier to control through the de-
centralized process because"' ••• the passivity of the peasant ••• and 
the tendency of basic social'~'units toward political solidarity 
invites the control of huge blocs of votes by knowledgeabla and 
influential leaders in the community.'tr66 These influential people 
are in tUrn pledged to another superior. 
The LOP has recognized a break down of the traditional 
oyabun-kobun relationships and is tt' ••• trying to replace them in 
part by recruiting popular support for local chapters. It67 Re-
placing them are more extensive support organizations which have 
less emphasis on the obligational norms found in the traditional 
system. One basic reason for this modern development is that "the 
64xawai, op.cit., p.115 
65Quigley and Turner, op.~it., po357. 
66Ibid., p.268. 
67xawai, op.cit., p.l29. 
new generation of political leaders haven't had time to develop 
oyabun-kobun to a great extent.-o8 
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Another reason for the diminishing influence of oyabun-
kobun is that issues are increasingly becoming the foeal point of 
political interest in Japan. Although this is a recent movement, 
it is spreading through the decentralized bailiwicks and currentl 
promising to penetrate the rural interterence generated by tradi-
tional socio-political traits. Moreover, the extent to which is-
sues are gaining priority in villages and burakus could make them 
the pioneering e~ment in the expunging of traditional political 
patterns. Where other parties have not diffused their organiza-
tions as have the Liberal Democrats or lack factional power con-
trols as the LOP possesses, conservative elements should continue 
as the pattern for rural voting. Expanding the currents of oyabun 
kobun into local branch organizations presides as a progressive 
movement in the conservative, grass-roots level of Japan. However, 
any success enjoyed by any party's local branches still depends 
upon support levied by 10ca1 leaders. 
68Kawai, op.cit., p,.l28. 
CHAPrER IV 
THE JIBAN: POWER POLITICS 
Competition for government office is the highlight of 
political interest in most nations maintaining two party or mul~ 
party sys tems. Incumbents seek'·as much organized support as needed 
to assure re-election. Accomplishement of this goal relies on the 
political record advanced by the incumbent and the persuasive and 
dedicated contributions made by party members. Rival parties con 
done policies they hope are accep,table to the pe ople; elected of-
ficials execute party policies while pursuing personal programs 
~erived from their own political beliefs and the demands of their 
constituencies and interest groups. This would seem to constitute 
a general perspective for most political struggles among parties 
in securing voter support.. To some extent this can be verified 
, 
in Japan's political system, unless one discerns the rural vil-
lages and hamlats, where political competition has been negated 
through traditionalism. 
Japanese voters explicitly associate themselves with 
personalities rather than party in rural communities. Burakuahave 
their 3personality consensus" fortified by wago and the norms of 
~ and ~iri. Urban areas. where a rising middle class enjoys some 
individuality in votihg~ has not shown significant changes when 
It comes time to wote ; personality is still. the basic cri teriOR, 
not party or program. This reinforces the traditional ]eader-fol-
lowe.r systemization of the rural areas which now comprise the faun 
datlons for support organizations of national party candidates. 
27 
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Organizing support for high govemmental office is a personal en-
deavor, one which depends upon traditional patterns to stabilize 
one's control of the vote. The political machine conclusive of 
this declared support is entitled a jiban. 
"One MUS t understand firs t that a jiban is a personal, 
not a party appurtenance. It is gained, belongs to, a nd is lost 
by an individual politician. 't09 "The primary goal of an organi-
zation of this type is the deliver of votes particula rly in pre-
fectural and national elections."70 A jiban organiz.ed by a rural 
leader is apt to be dependent upon traditional traits rather than 
any personal organi~tional aim. Maintaining the jiban necessi-
tates cooperation with certain influential men, yuryokusha. ~se 
'influential' persons on the buraku leval form the smallest mesh 
in a network that stretches u~ards to the prefectural politician 
from a rural consti tuency .. t1 71 outside of these influential men" 
jiban is a ither unobtainable or very unstab'B. Therefore, proper 
care must be placed in placating the yUryokusha 
Older local politicians have a definite edge in control-
ling a jiban. "'Japanese voters are invariably attracted to name 
and face so that an obscure candidate stands a very small chance 
of winning even if he is able to put forth a worth-while political 
campaign. "72 Applying the controlled vote a jiban represents, a 
69Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.425 
70Ibid." po426. 
71steiner, ~~., p.432. 
72Yanaga, 0 .cit., p.296 
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known looal politioian overoomes threats of oompetition with prao-
tioally no effort. This can be accomplished without a poli tiea! 
platform. Younger political aspirants are frequently unable to 
supplant the jiban of a favored incumbent unless they have suc-
ceeded in building one of their own. However, "young politicians 
and newcomers who have not yet succeeded in building a ~iban ••• 
find it to their advantage to run in electoral districts with a 
heavy f floating I vote, --73 where they will be unlikely confronted 
with staunch support organizationso 
PrefectUres are the principal, large-scale political 
divisions of Japan. From these 46 bailiwicks, 150 of the 250 
members of the House of Councilors are elected, a s are the crit-
ical members of the prefectural assemblies. At this level of gov-
ernment, jiban is currently being propagated with great enthu8-
iasm. 
"The jiban of the prefectural politician ••• has no aprlo;l 
existence. It consists of a nu~r of towns and villages that do 
not form m. unit in the consciousness of the inhabitants, and tha:: 
may indeed, have con.flicting interests and other causes .for antag-
on1sm."74 Personalism retains its primary position as the back-
bone for support, yet it is less stab~ for the pre.fectural pol-
itician. In composing a jiban, a prefectural candidate takes ad-
vantage of the following he has attracted in local politics, if 
73Ike, op.cit., p.208. 
74steiner, £E.cit., p.434 
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he has such experience. This following is characterized by per-
sonal loyalty to several other individuals whom the prefectural 
assembly candidate should exploit. If the candidate can claim 
this' web of voter support, he is capable of effecting local elec-
tions and offering his vote support to • national party for nat-
ional e~ctions. The Japanese political process also accentuates 
the position of the prefectural assembly candidate for Min all e-
lections, the candidates who have received the largest pluralities 
are declared the winners, provided that each has exceeded a legal 
minimum. tt 75 Thus, the prefectural candidate can afford to have 
competi tion as long a! his declared support looms as a durable st 
dard for election. Furthermore, his asserted backing attracts 
national candidates who know that if they obtain several of these 
pO]itical mainstays in their election districts they can magnify 
their election chances. MA common way for a member of the House 
of Representatives to create such an organization is to acqUire, 
through personal or financial ties, several followers who are ac-
tive and influential in prefectural politics.,t76 
With a basis grounded in rural areas where the ~yo­
kusha, who " ••• range in type from men of integrity to those on the 
criminal fringe •• ,"77 exploit the traditional mores~ constructed 
jibans are ft ••• most frequently the stock-in-trade of conservative 
75Quigley and Turner, op.cit., p.262 
76Ike, op.cit., p.199 
77Ibid., p.75 
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politicians.~78 Being basically conservative, the Liberal Demo-
crats have a waiting them decided support. "I:t may be assumed that 
candidates are less likely to be party affiliated where the hold 
of tradition is strong,"19 but conservative bases allow Liberal 
Democrats to identify with these "unaffiliated" candidates. 
Tn the grass-roots buraku, jiban i. political support 
tar removed from any party linkager nevertheless, it is political 
support. When a prefectural leader declares political party af-
filiation, he automatically secures "party affiliation" for hi. 
supporters, who remain undeclared. However, the party of the 
leader may repulse his followers causing him to yield his backing 
which may be sought by another popular leader. 
Liberal Democrats avert much of this changeableness with 
their proclaimed conservatism. These men have usually experienooc 
the perplexing conditions of local voting behavior and thus under-
stand what modes to follow in order to sustain support. 
Party label remains insignificant even in prefectural 
e Ie c t ions .'; s ignifyi ng that c and id ate s do run sa inde p enden ts • 
What success do independent candidates currently have as support 
systems continue to expand? In village elections, party labels 
do not effect the voting patterns because most people vo~e con-
servative, although not directly for the LDP. Many prefectural 
candidates still run unaffiliated which is " ••• evidence of the 
78steiner, op.cit., p.437. 
79Ibid., p.J95. 
public uncertainty about politics,n80 a valid uncertainty since 
parties have faile d to related all political ac tivi ties to rural 
areas. 
32 
In the 1955 elections, It ••• 98.2 per cent of the elected 
town and village assemblymen were independents. This ':droP:ged' 
to 95.0 per cent in 1963 • "81 t'Tn 1955 all town and villege as-
sembly seats in Fukui and a 11 but one of the seats in Yamagata, 
Ibaraki, Shimane, and Oi ta went to independents .'t82 
Many independents claim to have ~onservative leanings 
with small portions claiming Socialist inclinations and several 
contending pure independency. 'The role of the independent in 
national elections is no longer significant nor is it very mean-
ingful in prefectural elections~ And to some degree, pure inde-
pendency has been eliminated even though the electoral records 
disclose that independents should be holding many political of-
fices in the governmental a s8emb lies. In<i;ependent has becone a 
title for candidates not openly affiliated with a political party. 
80Neumana, op.cit., p.J39. 
81Steiner, op.oitJ" p.398. 
82Ibid., p.398. 
CHA.PrER V 
FACTIONALISM: TEE LIFEBLOOD OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
Buraku conservatism, modified obligational systems, and 
potent yet shifty support blocs are the predominant political 
traits .found tod~y'l1n Japan. These three elements, collectively 
taken, constitute the .foundations of Japan'. factionalized party 
system. In their attempts to accomodate the maturing political 
individual, the pi rliamentary parties are coerced to circulate in 
the remotest areas. Accomplishing this party decentralization 
forces the parties to rely heavily upon their factions who are 
closer to the changing political person although they are proxi-
mate to only a limited portion of the nat ion. 
"Shifts in party membership and splintering of parties 
are occurring constantly in Japan. But these shifts and splinters 
are not caused by the intenaity of political belief~ and senti-
ments but by the intensity of personal feeling and loyalty to a 
leader. u83 ~he Japanese parties, especially the conservative 
parties, may still be described as clusters of leader-follower 
groups involved in continuously shifting alliances and with each 
group itself undergoing frequent changes.lte,. Japan's political 
parties depend upon factional leaders and their support organiza-
tions to demonstrate the political processes to their people. 
Electoral Buccess for national parties cannot be delivered outB~e 
83yanaga, op.cit., p.91. 
84Neumann, op.cit" p.339. 
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of the factions. On the other hand, "the relative strength of fac 
tions within the parties depends largely on the number of Diet 
seats the respective factions manage to capture. tt85 Party facti 
thus are semi-autonomous, having their own support groups and pol-
icies, while simultaneously being connected with national parties 
and their respective programs. When factional leaders lack true 
party loyalty they control their cons_ituencies for themselves 
alone,. eliminating any partyattiliation. Should they be affil-
iated and lose their connection through a shift in leadership or 
by disassociation, they can offer support to another nationalp . 
or remain simply an autonomous grQup. subsequently, »the faction 
within each party must therefore continue to be handled pretty 
much as separate parties ••• "86 The national 
tion as a mediatory or conciliatory institution ••• f187 in resolving 
conflicts between the factions. 
The LOP has been blessed with the traditional conserv-
atism of the rural areas which has affeeted the characteristic 
bloc voting o Attracting the rural bosses~ not entire groups, has 
been sufficient because » ••• practically no effort is made in the 
recruiting of new party members at the grass-roots level because. 
votes can be delivered to the designated candidate. n88 Once the 
85xawai, op.cit. r p.126. 
86Ibid., pp. 114-15. 
87Yanaga, op.cit., p.237. 
88Ibid., p.254. 
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rural leaders are in the fold, the national party can dismiss any 
elaborate plans for a local organization. Controlling hierarchal 
leaders,es thoae in the prefectural assemblies, is a more prom-
inent factionalization factor because these leaders manage such 
larger voting blocs. 
Having controlled the government continuously since 1955 
as the LOP and for many years previous through conservative org-
anizations, severa! personalities have constantly pulled heavy 
majori ties in the nation, except in some urban areas. It should 
be conclusive that "factionalism in the LDP has neither kept it 
from power not paralyzed its action in political crises. n89 In 
1960, the LOP held 296 seats or 6303 per cent of the entire mem-
bership in the House of Representatives.* 
Maintaining harmonious relations with each faction ia 
difficult because of the I emi-autonomous nature of the parties. 
This self-governing ability permits rival factions to oonflict in 
attempting to finance their respective factions and also to elect 
particular faction candidates. 
"The lack of a really effective centralized fund-raising 
organization in the conservative party haa also contributed to 
factionalism, by making individual politicians look primarily to 
89Maki, op.cit., p.161 
* From a table found on page 69 in: Robert E. Ward and Roy 
C. Macridis,eds., Modern Political sJstema:ASia (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jerseyt Prentice-!811:Inc., 1963 • 
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influential political support. '·90 "lloreover, each faction wi thin. 
the conservative party has at least one organization bearing some 
innocuous or academic title, the real purpose of which i. to 001-
lect political funds~~9l When the LOP faction seeks influential 
patron., they primarily entreat con.ervative individuals with nat-
ional power. Because these local entities frequently rely on nat-
ional party funds, their conservative candidates ~ ••• are likely 
to stress their relationship to persons in positions ot power on 
the national level, persons who are a lso conservative. "92 Buttres 
sing their factional organization with external sources of fu~ 
LOP factions tend to represent limited interests which must rely 
on the success that the faction earn. at the polls if they are to 
be advanced. 
"Factionalism within the LOP ••• i. a matter of personal-
itie •••• "9" and the financial backing each conservative candidate 
csn acquire from hi. factional leader may determine hi. chances 
in an election. An individual candidate can augment the vital 
a.sistance; ot his factional leader by running as a n official mem-
ber of the LOP, unless the factional leader is not strongly con" 
nected with the national party. The principal dilemma which co.-
lervative factions are faced with is which conservative candidate 
90gdwin O. Reischauer, Japan: Past and Present (New Yorks 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p.2bf. 
91Soalapino, opocit., p.89. 
92steiner, op.cit., p.397. 
93vaki, opocit., p.l60. 
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to support. 
For example: A House of Representa ti ve dis trict in Japan 
generally returns from three to five Ddet members in their elec-
tions. Conservatives have repeatedly controlled this House by 
tak ing advant age of tradi tionalis.m and affiliated supp·ort orgalli-
zations. Therefore,Should they attempt to sweep an election dis-
trict or maximize their chances and run only those whom they pos-
itively feel will be victorious' 
Faction leaders often mwst decide on which candidates 
will run. An LOP incumbent usually has no endorsement problems 
because having been elected, his ..... strength becomes s:olidified 
until it is mearly impossible to dislodge him from party nomina-
tion;"94~ Other aspirants must be selected and finanoed through 
the faotion itself and :hlterest groups. The party too may donate 
additional funds. Thirdly, certain conaervatives not allied with 
the faction leader or the national party cause supplementary prob 
lems by Dominating their own choice. What can and does invariSbl 
occur is that the conservative-based candidates are too numerous~ 
thereby diminishing their chances and fomenting struggles with one 
another. Factional control of pertinent districts decreases the 
probability of such occurrenoes, but the instability of these or-
ganizations permits the possibility to persist. 
The IDP has branched its party organizatiol'l hopiBg that 
it ~o •• would he~p to eliminate destructive factional competition 
94Lawrence Olson, Dimensions of Ja1an (New York: American University Field Staff, Inc., 1963), p. 730 
among what remains of rival personal machines of the same party 
in each 10cality."95 This rivalry, external to the problems men-
tioned previously within the faction and to the top factional 
leader, a lso diminishes con.servative streng"h during the election& 
Despite the dependence on unstable factional cooperation 
aad the ineffectiveness of national party branching, conservatives 
continue to procure majori ties in many districts a tall levels ot 
government. ExploitatioR of the traditional socio-political de-
terminants and the conservative organi~ations prodUcing mas. vot-
ing has greatly enhanced the LOP position as the leader among Jap-
anese political parties. Jibsn is the most notorious political 
entity of the conservative LOP and its factions. It has become a 
permanent political force through which a candidate not only helps 
himself, but helps his fellow party candidates. Use of the jiban 
has been an absorbemt political tool im the rural areas for the 
LDP factions. Conservative leanings which are characteristic in 
rural areas must be nursed if they are~to be utiliz~d Oft higher 
election level.~ For if the people did not attach this support to 
a personality, there would be a distinct "floating'" or un.deter-
mined vote. As long as the LOP can rest assure that they possess 
the indubious support for conservatives, they are permitted more 
time to politically influemce people in leis conservative areas, 
such as the cities. This explicitly depends on the degree of po-
litical maturation throughout Japan and the policies promoted by 
the LOP and rival parties. 
95Kawai, op.cit., p.l29. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE EXPENDABILITY OF RURAL CAMPAIGNS 
Political campaigns serve as implements for bringing a 
candidate into full view of the voters. Distribution of propa-
gandist pamphlets; statements to the public and retorts of' 0ppo-
lition charges through the mass media; and unceaaing hand-shakiag 
and baby-kissing are integral parts of' an election campaign. In 
Japan, government regulations are imposed on. political campaigRing 
legally limiting the role they playo On the contrary, these set 
rules are easily avoided and overlooked through tactical proced-
ures, making these legalities barely realistic and completely im-
practical. The one specific advantage of' government regulation 
insofar as the Japanese parties are concerned is that they do of-
fer various free services to the parties as limited numbers of 
campaign posters and sponsorship in the mas. media. 
Campaigning ia the burakd is practically negligible ex-
cept when the local candidates visit their oonstttuenoiel in order 
to bpief their henohmen (as the yuryokusha)on election trivial-
ities. ~We may note that in town and village assembly elections 
the overwhelming prevalence of the (fixed vote l - in other word., 
the al mOlt complete absence of a I floating vote t - makes campaign.s 
Ultne ce s. aI7 • It 96 
"There are also a substantial number of' individuals who 
are in efi'ect nothing but robots in the voting process. Such 
96s'teiner, op.cit., p.4l1 
individuals, found most rrequently in agrarian communities,exer-
oi8e no judgme~t, but vote according to advioe and instruction or 
others. "97 The local candidate need not was te time ed run.ds in 
conducting any campaign where it has proven to be dispensable, un-
less vigorous opposition appears. 
Absence of active rural campaigning alao enables the LOP 
to SUbstantiate their power for the conservatives have more time 
and money to distribute among their ractions in insecure or quite 
doubtful regions where tlfloatin.g'· votes are numerous. 
97Ike, op.oit., p.205. 
CHAPTER VII 
LIBERAL DErKOCRATS AND SOCIALISTS IN JAPAN TODAY 
With the Japanese political process in a definite state 
of maturation, party policies are becoming essential in electio.-
eering, although the force has not as yet truly penetrated rural 
area •• t~ecause of the plurality of interests that people have ••• 
policies are formulated with great flexibility and ata ted simply!'93 
The national parties therefore "do not tell the voters very c1Mui 
what they may expect from them."99 Nevertheless, as the Japanese 
continue to braoden their political knowledge, explicit policies 
are being demanded although political parties are not always ac-
comodating. Just what are the major parties doing to meet this 
development and what can be speculated about rural conservatism 
and the LDP? 
"The fact that both major parties today are in some de-
gree single interest group parties, contribute. in certai~ re.~ta 
to political stability.~lOO In accordance with political stabDit,y 
aDd growing political modernization, the individual has become 
more politically involved independent ~d knowledgeable and th~­
fore btcreasingly evaluative o During the 1950's, "the individual 
was being emaacipated from traditiona~ social controls."lO~ thus 
98yanaga, opocit., po26l o 
99Ibid., p.265. 
100Scalapi.o, op.cit., p.71. 
101Burks, op.cit~, p.~64. 
allowing him to attain his own outlook on politics. Also, tfthe 
decay of the family system accelerates the social and behavioral 
shift from an almost collective or family basis to a considerably 
more individualized basis. n l02 With this expansio1'1 of political 
modernization into the development of actual political thinking, 
LOP power should be challenged especially on the grass-roots leve 
We may no_ ia.pect both the Socialist and Liberal Democratic Par-
ties in order to peroeive what they have~compli.hed in meeting 
this changing political society. 
"Socialist. are stronger in the cities tham im rural 
areas, and with cities growing their total vote can be expected 
to increase ••• However, eight millioR vote. still separate the two 
parties and how to surpass the 'wall of 01'1e-third' is the So~ 
perennial dilemma. Jtl0 3 Even though ttthe leftist vote ••• has beell 
growing at a slow but remarkably steady pace ••• "104 ftthe popular 
vote for the Socialists has revealed an erratic trend ••• ·'105 This 
eocentric course 1'10W leaves the Socialists with a steady, yet di-
minished vote, f or the Democratic Socialists have completed their 
split. The Demooratic Socialists .tand by parliamentary democracy 
and a welfare state toullded on the electoral process •. Their right 
ist leaning also make!! them fair game for absorptioll by the LDP 
102aeardaley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.443. 
1030180ll, op.oit., p.397. 
lo4Reischauer, op.cit., p.264. 
105Maki, £E~.' p.156. 
should their electoral ability prove unsuccessful. In 1963, the 
Democratic Socialist. managed to gain six new seats in the House 
of Representatives while they lost better tham one per cent of 
their already small popular vote. 
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A second failing of the Socialist Party is their abso-
lute dependence Oll sohyo, aa"'amalgama'tion of Japanese trade unio:u. 
Thi. group is the lifeblood of socialistic existence although it 
" ••• oaJ\Rot produce enough votes for the Sociali.ts to come to pa.r 
as a olass party. It 106 There is inten.se factiol\alization even 
though the Sooialist. hold to a rigid ideology, a factor which 
has ·>made it difficult for them to appeal to other iftterest 
groups!~107 outside the labor organizatiOfta. In order for the So-
cialists to re.elve a majority standing they will have to persuade 
the DSP baok to their ranks by discarding harsh ideological prin-
ciples. Also, naRY Socialist party ••• will have to broade. and 
moderate its stand to suchan extent that its formation of a Gov-
ernme.t will probably Rot represent any fundamental threat to the 
conservative forces. ul08 
Thirdly, S'ocialists have the minority party stigma."tJB:ino 
amy system of party govermment, the party out of power cam de~op 
a considerable seAse of frustration if lORg kept from control of 
lo6nr. I.I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan 
(Londo.: Oxford University Press, 1900), Po4oS. 
l07Baerwald, op.cit., p.227. 
lo8Morris, op.oit., p.408. 
109Maki, op.oit., p.2l9. 
goverrunent."'109 Professor Steiner states: 
But in Japan, this frustration is 
aggravated because the opposition 
feels that it represents the po-
litically conscious and the artic-
ulate segment of the populatiom 
and that the 'public opinion' it 
represents is constantly disregar-
ded by the ruling party which COA-
trols the masses of politically un-
sophisticated rural voters and is 
able to exercise its power without 
regard for the correctness or incor-
rect.ess of its policies.110 
44 
A.other factor coatributiRg to Socialist inability to 
generate stronger vote appeal is that Hneither the new generatioa 
of youag voters, not the peop~ moving into the rapidly expanding 
urban areas ••• seem to be nearly as favorabl~ inclined toward the 
Socialisrs as they might have been expected to be. Hlll BrealdRg 
the ties of traditional society is ROW affecting political uader-
standing for each individual who seeks it. But, the ideology sup-
ported by the Sooialists, which talks of "Marx and neutrality, 
power politics, and the American tenemyJttl12 has met with disfavor 
thereby pushing ideologically untinged LOP policies into the po-
liti6al limelight sim.ce they represent a broad spectrum with which 
to identify. 
Summarily, the Socialists do not attract tt ••• suffieie 
large numbers of mea who have iRflueRce aad standing in their 
llO$teiner, op.cit., p.467. 
lll ... .rapan's Frustrated Socialists 't Economist CXCVlr (Novembel) 
1990), p.798 o 
_',f.? \ ,;, .,.,.t,:)'~ 
l12Ibld., p.798. 
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communities."113 Especially in the eroding, traditional buraku 
oommunities they would seem to have had sUccess yet the conserv-
ative vote patterns persist. Detaohing the LDP from control o~ 
Japanese government does .ot seem likely unless the Socialists 
can ally themselves with all other parties. Even then, this amal-
gamation would aooount for a minority positioa. 
Liberal Democrats have been a1\ entreached majority in 
the national legislature aRd other governmental levels since the 
Occupation terminated the hauDting militarism characteristic o~ 
pre-war and war-time days. They have pereeived the effects of 
the Allied Occupatio. and the democratio institutibRs and policies 
condoliled for Japanese society. Political moderniZ',ation, inaugu-
rated in the late 194o! s and early 1950' s, consis ted of a tt ••• 
search for Rew methodological principles ••• and development of so-
cal~d undeveloped areas ••• ttll4 Modernization could only be ac-
complished by uBsettliag traditional behavior, especially i1\ the 
rural areas. Some tradition had to be preserved in order to alOid 
complete confusion end probable defeat of any new measures. What-
ever changes have taken hold, the LOP remains in control of Japa-
uese goverame.t with a fairly strong hand. 
During the 1950's, attempts were made to break doWR the 
rigid traditionalism of rural Japan with hope that the individual 
~ould escape the group consciousness which perpetuated familial 
l13Ike, opoci!., p.176. 
l14R.E. Ward, "Political Modernization and culture i. JapaJl't 
World PQlitics XV (July, 1963), p.569. 
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cohesiveDess. Imdividuality has beem stressed together with po-
litical maturation for the inte.tioR or advaRcing Japan socially 
and politically. What has beea the effect on bUraku lire and tra 
ditio.al conservatism! 
~8ost buraku inhabitants admit that there is less cohe-
sion thrua there used to be, and the older generations frequently 
complain about the unrest, disobedience, and non-comformist views 
and practices of the youllger people.ttllS The familial system is 
gradually decayimg thus causing " ••• the sooial amd behavioral 
shift from an almost completely col19 ctive or family basis to a 
CORS iderab ly more ind i vidual ize d bas is." 116 What has this imposed 
om the political situation i. the buraku? 
"The slack resultimg from the weakeDing of traditional 
behavior patterl'ls has to be taken up by me'll types of appeals ad 
by the oraatioB or local party organizations.~117 The toP has 
challeaged this trend by instituting agrarian rerorms and by cen-
tralizing their party organizatioa, thereby reinforcing the co.-
servative commitment in the burakus. "Limited in occupatio. and 
living area, apathetic and resignedoo,"ll8 the buraku people re-
main partially isolated from modernization. 
ll5steimer, 2Pocit., p.224o 
ll6Beardsley, Hall, amd Ward, op.cit., p.J+43o 
l17steiDer, opocit., p.228. 
l180lso., op.cit.~ p.73. 
Despite their ftumerical decline 
and i~fl1tratio. of Roa-agrarian 
ele meltts irlto their midst, Jap-
anese farmers still are a supremely 
importaftt political bloc for the 
conservative cause. They cORtlnue 
to represeBt the largest single 
socio-eooRomic category of voters 
by a considerable measuree ll9 
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.tMost Japanese are still con.servative, but this does 
not mean~that they n.ecessarily approve of what conservative can-
didates do after they are elec1Jed. tt120 (This is Olson's summary 
of 1960 election patterns-patterns currently in effect). As the 
people become wary of LDP activities they are /llpt to exercise 
their political i~dividuality at the polls, discarding traditional 
behavior in favor of an appeal to policy. Siace opposing parties 
have remained doctrinaire (as the Socialists and Commuaists) or 
do not have sufficient support as yet (as the Democratic Socialfu_ 
and Komeito), the LOP has partially filled the gap by presentiltg 
new faces of political leadership through their faction-ridden 
organization. This has caused further rift among LOP members to-
day as Prime MiRister Sato continues to struggle with conflicting 
party members and segme.ts of the matioRal population. 
The Liberal Democratic Party continues its reign as C~­
troller of Japanese governmeBt, a role which still defies true 
consideratioD. of a upublic illterest." Not everyone participates 
in the political process .or benefits from its activities.~li~al 
ll9Scalapiao, op.cit., p.90. 
1200lson, op.cit., p.227. 
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parties leave something to be desired as main instruments in Jap-
anese politics. It can 0111'1 be comcluded that ft: ••• Japan has not 
attained a full measure of political modernizatlon. rt121 
121Ward aDd Rustow, op.cit., p.410 o 
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